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O
n March 18, 2008, the U.S. 
Supreme  Court  heard  oral 
arguments in District of Columbia 
v. Heller, a case challenging hand-
gun-control statutes adopted in 
1976  in  Washington,  D.C.  The 
question  before  the  Court  is 
whether the District’s prohibition 
of further registration of hand-
guns, its ban on the carrying of 
concealed guns, and its mandate 
that guns kept in homes remain 
unloaded and either locked or dis-
assembled violate citizens’ rights 
that are guaranteed by the Sec-
ond Amendment of the Consti-
tution.
What we do about handguns 
is of course a question of public 
policy.  Because  of  the  Second 
Amendment, it is also a question 
of  constitutional  law.  And  the 
point of constitutional law is to 
make it difficult for us to adopt 
some policies that seem to us to 
be  good  ones  at  the  moment. 
The Supreme Court’s upcoming 
decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller dramatizes the tension be-
tween public policy and the Con-
stitution.
The Second Amendment says 
that  “a  well  regulated  Militia, 
being necessary to the security 
of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.” Partisans 
on  both  sides  think  that  the 
Amendment’s meaning is clear. 
According to gun-control advo-
cates, the opening reference to a 
militia means that the right pro-
tected in the second clause is nec-
essarily  limited  to  keeping  and 
bearing arms in connection with 
service in an organized militia. 
According to gun-rights advocates, 
the second part of the Amend-
ment protects an individual right, 
no  different  in  kind  from  the 
right of free speech protected by 
the First Amendment.
In fact, interpreting the Sec-
ond Amendment is a genuinely 
difficult task, precisely because we 
have to determine the relation be-
tween the first clause, sometimes 
called the Amendment’s pream-
ble, and the second, sometimes 
called  its  operative  clause.  The 
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guns in public, and all but three 
states generally prohibit local reg-
ulation.  If  people  have  broadly 
applicable gun rights under the 
Constitution,  all  laws  limiting 
those  rights  —  and  criminal 
convictions based on those laws 
— will be subject to judicial re-
view.  Policymakers  will  avoid 
setting other limitations, know-
ing  that  court  challenges  will 
follow.
Consider Yoshi Hattori’s death 
in light of District of Columbia v. Hell-
er. Rodney  Peairs  was  tried  for 
manslaughter.  His  lawyer  sum-
marized Peairs’s defense as fol-
lows: “You have the legal right 
to answer everybody that comes 
to  your  door  with  a  gun.”  A 
Louisiana jury acquitted him af-
ter  3  hours’  deliberation.  That 
state’s laws now justify homicide 
under  many  circumstances,  in-
cluding compelling an intruder to 
leave a dwelling or place of busi-
ness, and provide immunity from 
civil  lawsuits  in  such  cases. 
Thirteen  other  states  have  fol-
lowed suit.
A  Supreme  Court  decision 
broadening gun rights and over-
turning the D.C. statutes would 
be  widely  viewed  as  upholding 
such policies. By promoting our 
sense of entitlement to gun use 
against  one  another,  it  could 
weaken the framework of ordered 
liberty  that  makes  civil  society 
possible.
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preamble could be a condition, 
limiting the scope of the opera-
tive clause, or it could merely be 
an explanation: “The reason peo-
ple  have  an  individual  right  to 
keep  and  bear  arms  is  that  it 
makes it easier to provide a mili-
tia as the security to a free state.” 
(In the case of District of Columbia 
v. Heller, there’s some basically silly 
discussion of whether the Second 
Amendment even applies to the 
District, since it isn’t a “state.” 
It’s quite clear that the term in 
the Second Amendment refers to 
organized governments and not 
to the narrower group of subna-
tional units we call the states of 
the United States.)
Gun-control  advocates  point 
out that when the term “militia” 
is used elsewhere in the Consti-
tution,  it  always  refers  to  the 
state-organized militia (roughly, 
though imperfectly, analogous to 
today’s state-organized National 
Guard). So, they argue, the Sec-
ond Amendment’s preamble also 
refers to the state-organized mi-
litia. To them, the Amendment is 
part  of  a  package  of  constitu-
tional provisions expressing the 
framers’ suspicion of a permanent 
national army. It guarantees that 
Congress cannot disarm the state-
organized militia. They also point 
out that in the late 18th century, 
individuals might have been con-
sidered to have a right to “keep” 
arms, but the phrase “keep and 
bear arms” was used only in ref-
erence to military operations.
Gun-rights  advocates  have  a 
different  view.  Their  strongest 
point is that the Bill of Rights is 
a bill of individual rights. They 
argue  that  the  Second  Amend-
ment’s preamble explains why we 
have an individual right to keep 
and bear arms. And the “militia” 
mentioned in the preamble, in this 
view, is not the state-organized 
militia but rather what 18th-cen-
tury thinkers described as the un-
organized militia, the whole body 
of  the  people  who,  if  armed, 
would be able to resist efforts by 
an oppressive government or to 
provide self-protection when the 
government failed in its duty to 
protect  against  predators  and 
criminals.
This reading does make sense 
of the preamble’s reference to the 
militia — but at some cost. If the 
point of the Second Amendment 
is to allow the body of the people 
to resist an oppressive government, 
isn’t the Amendment entirely ob-
solete? Modern governments have 
tanks and bombs that they could 
use against the people, and sure-
ly, as gun-control advocates say, 
we can’t fairly interpret the Sec-
ond Amendment as guaranteeing 
the people a right to own antitank 
weapons and bazookas. Interpret-
ing the Amendment as protecting 
weapon ownership only in connec-
tion with membership in a state-
organized militia avoids this dif-
ficulty.
Such are the arguments regard-
ing the Second Amendment’s lan-
guage as it might have been un-
derstood  when  it  was  adopted. 
But constitutional interpretation 
also takes into account relevant 
legal tradition; unfortunately, both 
sides have good arguments on this 
front as well. On the gun-control 
side, there’s the undoubted fact 
that state governments have reg-
ulated weapon ownership quite 
extensively since early in the 19th 
century. The national government 
didn’t get involved in large-scale 
weapon regulation until the 20th 
century.  But  when  it  did,  the 
courts routinely upheld the reg-
ulation because they believed that 
the Second Amendment protected 
a right only in connection with 
membership in a state-organized 
militia  (see  box).  Such  a  tradi-
tion  of  extensive  regulation  of 
gun ownership that was upheld 
against constitutional challenge 
should count for something.
Gun-rights advocates point to 
another tradition: many state con-
stitutions provide guarantees of 
what is clearly an individual right 
to own weapons. And the Supreme 
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Key Court Rulings about Gun Regulation and the Second Amendment.
United States v. Cruikshank (1876, Supreme Court): Congress does not have the  
authority to legislate against private interference with the right to bear arms.
Presser v. Illinois (1886, Supreme Court): The Second Amendment protects individ-
uals from federal but not state interference with their right to bear arms.
United States v. Miller (1939, Supreme Court): The Second Amendment does not pro-
tect the rights of persons to own firearms that would not be used by a militia.
United States v. Emerson (2002, federal appeals court in Atlanta): The Second 
Amendment does protect an individual’s right to possess firearms, but a law  
prohibiting persons subject to a domestic-abuse protection order from pos-
sessing firearms is constitutional.
Silveira v. Lockyer (2002, federal appeals court in California): The Second Amend-
ment does not protect an individual’s right to possess firearms but does pro-
tect states’ rights to protect themselves.
District of Columbia v. Heller (2007): Federal appeals court rules that D.C. law pro-
hibiting handguns is unconstitutional. Supreme Court grants cert.
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Court  has  said  —  in  cases  in-
volving the death penalty and as-
sisted suicide — that state-level 
traditions properly influence the 
interpretation of provisions in the 
national Constitution.
The  briefs  filed  in  the  D.C. 
case  make  many  additional  ar-
guments, but the constitutional 
question  is  genuinely  difficult. 
(For what it’s worth, my own view 
is that the gun-rights side has a 
slightly better argument than its 
opponents if we focus only on the 
time when the Amendment was 
adopted and that the gun-control 
side has a slightly better argument 
than its opponents if we use the 
whole range of constitutional ar-
guments that the courts have said 
usually matter. But for me, both 
debates are too close to call.)
So what can we expect from 
the Supreme Court? Early in the 
Bush administration, the Depart-
ment of Justice issued an exten-
sive legal analysis supporting the 
gun-rights  view  of  the  Second 
Amendment. It has adhered to that 
position in the D.C. case but with 
an important twist. Suppose the 
Second Amendment does protect 
an individual right. Still, like all 
rights, that right can be regulat-
ed by the government for good 
reasons — as the Amendment’s 
reference to a “well regulated” mi-
litia itself suggests. In the First 
Amendment  setting,  we  let  the 
government regulate speech only 
if it has extremely good reasons 
for the regulation.
The Bush administration argues 
in the D.C. case that what lawyers 
call the “standard of review” for 
gun regulations is different from 
that for speech regulations. Law-
yers delineate three categories of 
reasons for regulation: In instanc-
es in which really good reasons 
should be required for restricting 
a specific right, the regulations 
are subject to “strict scrutiny” by 
the courts; in situations in which 
relatively  strong  but  not  over-
whelming reasons should be re-
quired, the regulations are sub-
ject  to  “intermediate  scrutiny”; 
and when legislators just ought 
to have some modest reason for 
thinking that the regulation does 
some good, the regulation is sub-
ject only to “rational basis review.” 
The Bush administration says that 
the District’s handgun ban is sub-
ject to intermediate scrutiny and 
that there is some reason to think 
it could survive such scrutiny.
The first question the Supreme 
Court  will  have  to  confront  in 
the D.C. case is whether the Sec-
ond Amendment does indeed pro-
tect an individual right. If it finds 
that it does, the Court will have 
to decide what standard of review 
to apply to gun regulations. That, 
I suspect, is where the real ac-
tion will be. Nonlawyers watch-
ing the Court’s decision should 
focus on the bottom line. If the 
Court affirms the lower court, it 
will  have  held  that  the  Second 
Amendment protects an individ-
ual right and that the District’s 
handgun ban cannot survive the 
appropriate level of scrutiny. If it 
vacates the lower court’s decision, 
the Court will be saying that the 
handgun ban might be constitu-
tional if the lower courts apply 
the  correct  standard  of  review. 
And if it reverses the lower court, 
the Court will have rejected the 
“individual rights” interpretation 
of the Second Amendment alto-
gether.
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